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Structured Abstract
Purpose: By tracing the history of the links of financialization to consumer behaviors and
marketer actions in the 20th century, this paper aims to show that consumer market
phenomena are often shaped by the imperatives of finance.
Design/methodology/approach: The paper employs selective historical overviews, mainly
focusing on the United States, of four tranches of the past century: (1) the run up to the
Great Depression, (2) from post-Depression to World War II, (3) the post WW-II Bretton
Woods system and its collapse in the 1970s, and (4) the increasingly risk-charged last three
post-Bretton Woods decades of the 20th century.
Findings: The historical review shows that financial sector’s interest in profiting from
consumer markets emerged and grew fairly early in the 20th century, experienced some
slowdown and forced retrenchment due to the military-industrial build up prior to and
during WW-II, and re-accelerated in post-WW-II period – reaching an unsustainable risky
zenith by the closing years of the century.
Practical implications: Findings and arguments from this paper can be of value to citizen
and consumer advocates seeking to bring Finanzkapital activities under popular and
democratic control.
Social implications: Insights from this paper should motivate us to study in greater depth
how established and seemingly autonomous consumer and marketer behaviors, in the
ultimate, may be guided by and have to conform to the dictates of financial capital.
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Originality/value: The main contribution is an elaboration of how financial capitalism has
shaped consumption styles and marketing practices in the last century.

Keywords
Finanzkapital, Consumption history, Economic history, Retailing history, Marketing regulation
history, Financialization

“If anyone wishes to paint the genesis of things in our society, he will paint [on the
ceiling of Sistine chapel] a picture of god holding out to Adam a check-book or credit
card or Charge-A-Plate.”
– Randall Jarrell (1962)
The post-2007 financial crisis opened up multiple intellectual inquiries about not only
how financialization shaped the global political economy (e.g., Dholakia 2011) but also how it
permeated daily life. It reignited interested in ‘Finanzkapital’, the original German term for
financialization of capitalism, introduced by Hilferding (1910) soon after the dawn of the 20th
century. The link between finance and commercial and consumer life is not new (Calder 1999) –
but is not explored much in marketing literature. In this Explorations note, I discuss how
financialization (Epstein 2005) shaped consumers and marketing institutions in the 20 th century.
Consumer credit is not an invention of the 20th century – the 1890 U.S. census estimated
consumer credit to be $844 per household (Calder 1999). The 20th century, however, saw the
emergence and proliferation of an unprecedented range of consumer credit tools – all of which
link rhizomatically to centers of global finance.
Finanzkapital of course shapes marketing not just through consumer credit: it also
directs marketing strategy to strengthen the top, bottom, or in-between lines in the income
statements of brand marketers – indeed financial surveillance of business tends to reinforce all
capillaries that connect industrial to institutional capital. Drawing upon considerable evidence
from business and marketing history, Tadajewski (2009) has argued that from late 1920s “the
growing interest in commercial research and the shift from a production orientation [and to a
consumer orientation] can be attributed to the pressures placed on business by the banking
industry” (p. 197).
My approach here is in the tradition of writings in marketing that deal with larger
macro-level forces at play, resulting in structuring of micro-level consumer choices and actions
as well as shaping of consumer lifestyles and consumption patterns (Firat and Dholakia 1982,
Nason 2008). The discussion that follows is organized along three 20th century watershed
events – Great Depression, Second World War, and Bretton Woods Erosion. These events split
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the 20th century into four tranches. Concluding comments close the 20th century discussion, but
with trepidation expressed for the unfolding 21st century.

The Path to Great Depression
The dawn of 20th century was also the opening page of pervasive modernity in
marketing formats – not just in London or Paris but also in the then-emerging economy of USA.
In his well-documented study of the Philadelphia and New York stores of John Wanamaker,
Tadajewski (2008) notes the appearance of many modern marketing formats – well-lit spacious
interiors, restrooms, fixed prices, straight-talk advertising, corporate public relations – by the
opening of the century.
In the United States, a unique engine – literally and figuratively – for innovations in
marketing and consumer finance was the automobile industry. Although Ford had early success
with mass production and marketing of the Model T, the transformational innovation was the
creation by General Motors (GM) of a financing company, the General Motors Acceptance
Corporation (GMAC). Historical notes at the GM Heritage Center website inform us of the
following (Bowman n.d.):
In the early days of the motor vehicle industry, dealers paid cash to stock their
inventory, purchasing just a few vehicles at a time. With the onset of the assembly line,
manufacturers wanted dealers to buy vehicles in large quantities, in order to keep
factories running regularly. GMAC was formed in 1919 and provided GM dealers with
the financing they needed to maintain their vehicle inventories, as well as give the
dealer's retail customers the ability to purchase new vehicles easily and conveniently.
[In]… 1919… [the] first branch was opened in New York City and was capitalized at
$2,500,000. Later that year, branches opened in Detroit, Chicago, San Francisco, and
Toronto. [In] 1920… [a] branch opened in Great Britain… [By] 1928… [the] four millionth
retail contract was signed… [and by] 1958… GMAC financed its 40 millionth vehicle and
its first ever annual earnings of $1 billion were achieved. GMAC also entered the
mortgage business at this time.
It was the imperatives of industrial capital (keeping the assembly line running), and not the
needs of the consumers, that created the powerful and life-shaping system of automobile
finance. Over time, these imperatives transformed to those of Finanzkapital: GMAC (renamed
Ally Bank after the wrenching restructuring of 2009) evolved into a major bank and mortgage
lender.
Consumer credit modernized rapidly. In the second decade of the 20th century,
consumer credit in the United States – hitherto provided by informal lenders – started
transforming into a formalized financial system. Calder (1999) writes:
…the modern system of credit for consumption has its roots in the two decades after
1915… Modern consumer credit was built on two institutional foundations. The first was
a particular method of credit – the installment plan… The installment plan was to
consumer credit what the moving assembly line was to the automobile industry.
3

Without it, today’s trillion dollar consumer credit industry would be inconceivable. The
other institutional foundation was an array of particular sources of credit…retailers,
commercial banks, personal finance companies, and sales finance companies (p. 17,
italics original).
For Finanzkapital, the new and varied sources of consumer credit opened up new pathways for
capital accumulation. Calder reports that the new consumer credit companies “adopted new
strategies to pursue aggressively the profits to be made in consumer lending markets” (p. 18).
The rise of consumer credit from the 1920s was spectacular, with the Depression putting only a
temporary break:
American household finance was remade after 1915 [leading to]…rising level[s] of
consumer debt…personal debt increased at rates well ahead of the rate of population
growth… From 1920 to 1929, the volume of consumer debt soared upward 131 percent,
from $3.3 billion to $7.6 billion outstanding. The Depression interrupted this rising
curve, but by 1937 consumer debt reached its pre-Depression levels and continued
rising upwards, until it was halted by credit controls during World War II (Calder 1999, p.
18).
The 1920s also saw the emergence of what we now call the “marketing of financial services”.
Since informal consumer credit had a bad reputation, the formal consumer credit companies
campaigned to change the image – indeed the very moral basis – of consumer credit. To quote
Calder again:
Painfully aware of the stigma attached to their forerunners in the consumer credit
business – pawnbrokers and loan sharks – the innovators of the credit revolution used
advertising and “educational” public relations campaigns to bring lending and borrowing
out of the urban shadows… By [1929], phrases such as “Buy Now, Pay Later!” and “Take
Advantage of Our Easy Payment Plan!” were standard phrases in the vocabulary of
American consumership (p. 20).
The 1920s thus were as a turning point in the relationship between Finanzkapital and
marketing. For the czars of finance, marketing was no longer a sideshow of carnival-barkers and
loan hucksters: it had become an important new source to feed the insatiable accretiveaccumulative urges of Finanzkapital. Consumer credit systems created profitable capillaries and
siphons from Main Street to Wall Street.
In the run up to the Great Depression, the center of Finanzkapital had shifted from
London to New York. Crafts and Fearon (2010) report that:
…after 1918 America replaced Britain as the world’s leading international lender…
Massive war debts accumulated by Britain and France [in WW-I] were owed to both the
US government and to US private citizens…the post-war network of inter-government
indebtedness eventually involved 28 countries, with Germany the most heavily in debt
… Between 1924 and 1931 the US was responsible for about 60 per cent of total
international lending, about one-third of which was absorbed by Germany… Austria,
Hungary, Greece, Italy, and Poland, together with several Latin American countries,
were also considered attractive opportunities by US investors. By paying for imports and
4

by investing overseas the US was able to send abroad a stream of dollars, which enabled
other countries not only to import more goods but also to service their international
debts (p. 289).
We can see here the laying of the foundations for the dollarized global (no longer national)
Finanzkapital, trade, and marketing that defined the century; with USA as the hub.

Reforms, Rise of Nazism, and World War-II
Since the world economy had become interconnected by the 1920s, the Depression
spread globally – particularly to Europe – though with varying degrees of national severity
(Crafts and Fearon 2010). The responses to Depression were also varying, particularly in the
United States and Germany. In both cases, as WW-II approached, Finanzkapital circuits were
temporarily rearranged – more severely in Germany – to channel consumer financial resources
into war efforts.
In Germany, smarting under the onerous burden of WW-I reparations and massive debt,
conditions were ripe for the rise of Nazism. By appealing to jingoistic nationalism and racial
supremacy, the Nazi regime created a tightly controlled statist system where unions were
banned, young men were conscripted, heavy industry and exports were promoted, and imports
were curbed. The banking system had undergone a severe crisis prior to Hitler assuming power
in 1933, and many controls were already in place to prevent currency flight. Rising saving banks
deposits – Deutschemark savings of German consumers, barred from moving money into
foreign currencies and with spending curtailed by import controls – found their way into the
war coffers of the Third Reich:
Aggregate savings deposits increased 110 percent between 1929 and 1938 more rapidly
than earned income … the Third Reich was the beneficiary, in that two-fifths of the
increase in deposits between 1932 and 1938 was applied to the purchase of the funded
loans of the Reich [for armaments and heavy industry]. This was the so-called noiseless
financing, which used direct placement to bypass stock market flotation, thus
eliminating the public signal of a market valuation of Reich debt. The application of
savings bank deposits in this way was also assisted by the reduction of savings banks'
advances to business and by the slower growth of their mortgage lending in the 1930s
than in the 1920s… (Balderston 1991, pp. 603-604).
The above quote indicates a number of processes at work during the rise of Nazism: (1) high
rates of consumer savings in Germany, (2) channeling of these savings into Third Reich
armaments purchasing, (3) such channeling facilitated by curbing day-to-day consumption
(consumer austerity) and curbing mortgage loans to consumers, (4) avoidance of financial
market scrutiny by the Third Reich by directly appropriating consumers’ bank savings for war
use (in other words, avoiding the floating of bonds that would invite scrutiny by rating
agencies).
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A perverse side note to the consumer austerity of the Nazi era was the Party’s ‘Strength
through Joy’ (KdF: Kraft durch Freude) program that provided leisure opportunities – such as
Mediterranean vacations – to selected few “master race” workers, as a foretaste of what future
would be like once Europe and North Africa were conquered (Baranowski 2004).
In the United States, the responses to Depression can be described as a hodgepodge of
populist measures, bank reforms, spasmodic stimulus attempts, and strengthening of labor
unions – and eventually, massive building up of the military-industrial complex. While
haphazard, the overall impact was a high-growth economy, though it was briefly derailed by the
sharp recession of 1937-38. U.S. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rates were strong in the
mid-1930s (10.9% in 1934, 8.9% in 1935, and 13.1% in 1936) and spectacular in the early 1940s:
17.1% in 1941, 18.5% in 1942, and 16.4% in 1943.
By the time America entered the war in 1941, its economy was booming and consumer
incomes were rising. The mass psychology of war required a shared sense of national sacrifice,
at least symbolic curtailments of consumption. There were some shortages and privations, but
by and large – apart from the bloody human costs on the battlefields in Europe and Asia –
Americans continued to enjoy most elements of the good life that they had been accustomed
to (Leff 1991). Indeed, American brands – with Coca-Cola as the magnificent exemplar –
increased their share of the market and of the mind, by building patriotic associations to the
war effort (Weiner 2002).
The end of the war also shaped American politics at home and abroad. For a while, with
reconstruction programs like the Marshall Plan – positioned as a benevolent venture but also
crafted opportunistically to bring increasing business to American firms – the private corporate
and financial capitalism of the preeminent postwar nation was sheathed in interventionist,
“blockage-removing”, state capitalist flows of funds to war ravaged nations (Maier 1991). The
American state enjoyed a few years of bipartisan (in terms of domestic politics) autonomy to
reshape the worlds of finance, trade, and aid – and to lay the groundwork for the abbreviated
Golden Age that followed.

A Golden Age?
The system of Finanzkapital was cast in the American mould in 1944 when delegates
from 44 allied nations met in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, and hammered out the
institutional frame for the post-WW-II financial system – the Bretton Woods System. The
subsequent 1945-1970 period – the so-called abbreviated ‘American Century’ – was as close as
possible to being the Golden Age of Finanzkapital as well as of marketing. While the seeds of
modern consumer culture were planted in the 1920s, they effloresced after WW-II. Picking up
the storyline of the 1920s in the West:
…from the post-war period, consumer culture…promoted a powerful link between
everyday consumption and modernization…the burgeoning advertising and marketing of
this era were selling not just consumer goods, but consumerism itself as the shining
path to modernity: they incited their publics to modernize themselves, modernize their
homes, their means of transport (Slater 1997, pp. 12-13).
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Of course the rapid-fire and pervasive modernization of life required modern means of
consumer finance, and the credit card was born (Klein 1999). Managed by banks, the credit
card generalized the system of consumer credit – much more so in the U.S. than in Europe
(Longemann 2008). Rather than obtaining loans for specific items from sellers or
manufacturers, these cards could be used to buy anything, including intangibles and services –
items that could not serve as collateral or be repossessed. Credit cards were the claws of
Finanzkapital embedded into the very core of consumer lives.
While Finanzkapital was inexorably globalizing in the background, in this third tranche of
the century there were still nationalist sentiments attached to industrial capital and to brands.
In particular, the U.S. dominance of finance was causing alarm. From 1945 to 1960, the U.S.
accounted for about three-fourths of worldwide Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). From Europe,
Servan-Schreiber (1967) railed against the hegemony of American businesses and brands,
supported by the massive tide of American outward FDI. The Golden Age was thus an age of
national contestation, with some pretense that capital and brands it controlled had some
national character.
Such financial nationalism disappeared fast. Where it did not, it created major
problems. In Japan, the government-surveilled tight linkage of Japanese Finanzkapital to
Japanese industry and brands ultimately proved disastrous. In America, unhampered by
nationalism, despite lurching crises, the Wall Street centers of finance moved with alacrity to
invest in or lend to brand-owning enterprises, and to consumers, in all parts of the globe – and
avoided the Japanese fate of stagnation, at least until the close of the 20th century.

Century’s End: Crumbling of Bretton Woods
The telling term to mark the century’s final historical watershed came from Japan:
“Nixon Shokku” or Nixon Shock (Sen 1982). In 1970, President Nixon abandoned the gold
standard undergirding the American dollar, and this led to a world of floating currencies. The
Golden Age institutions of global finance, emanating from Bretton Woods, began to fray at the
edges. From the global manager of currencies, the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
scrambled for a new role – and this scramble continues. Since 1970, IMF has variously acted as
the lender of last resort to governments, an arbiter among nations and banks, and – most
dreadfully, especially for consumers in developing nations – as the Global Financial Disciplining
Agency capable of forcing the price of bread to triple overnight at the corner store.
By 1970s, the veneer of nationalism about industries and brands had dissolved, at least
in America. Finanzkapital had conditioned American consumers thoroughly to buy Japanese
brands, made in China, sold through American mega-stores, and paid for with Euro-American
credit cards. With the crumbling of the Bretton Woods System, what Appadurai (1990) has
called “finanscapes” are no longer national and somewhat rule bound, and this has opened the
floodgates for financial “innovation”. According to Tett (2010):
…Bretton Woods system of credit and exchange controls, which had maintained relative
stability in world markets, broke down, and the values of foreign currencies, which had
been pegged to the dollar, became free-floating. That led to unpredictable swings in
7

exchange rates. Oil price shocks then sparked a pernicious blend of recession and
inflation in the US… Shocked investors scurried to find ways to protect themselves from
the devastating impact of the high interest rates … and from relentless swings in
exchange rate. [An]… innovative way to protect against swings was to buy derivatives
offering clients the right to purchase currencies at specific exchange rates in the future…
allowing investors and bankers to gamble on the level of rates in the future.
If the early-century, pre-Depression emergence of formalized consumer finance
represented an act of systematization, the late-century scramble for financial profits
represented an act of desperation – with the riskiest edge of financial capitalism transforming
into what has been dubbed “casino capitalism” (Strange 1997). In the last two decades of the
century, Finanzkapital – ever desperate for new avenues of accumulation – began to unleash a
growing range of “financially engineered” instruments (Patterson 2010), many of which relied
on hapless consumers accumulating greater debts. The sharp divergence between steady, high
credit card interest rates and falling overall interest rates (Massey 2009) made consumers the
golden cash cows for many financial institutions. Consumer credit had already proven to be a
great source of profits in the 1920s and in post-World War II period. By century’s end, creditdriven consumer demand became the desperate last refuge of Finanzkapital.
As the sun set on the 20th century, consumers were truly impaled on the horns of a
macro-micro dilemma. If they did not consume at high levels, the macro economy could plunge
into recessionary crisis. Infused with the drug of easy credit, if they did consume at exhorted
high levels, they faced the micro-level risk of defaulting and going bankrupt – all the while
continuing to pay exorbitant interest charges and penalties to the bankers.

Concluding Comments
In the marketing discipline, we need to come to grip with the fact that – especially in
times of economic crises – not just consumers but also marketing managers become mere
pawns in the Great Game of Finance, a game that has turned both global and reckless. The
tilting concentration of power in the global financial center affects all aspects of economy,
society and culture – including marketing practices, brands, and consumers. The impacts of
financial globalization – and I would add global financialization (Orhangazi 2008, Panitch and
Konings 2009) – are understood at some levels:
Financial globalization clearly enhances the leverage of investor interests… Owners of
[globally] mobile capital…gain influence at the expense of less fortunate actors,
including…national capital as well as labor (Cohen 1996, p. 286).
We need to add consumers to the ranks of “less fortunate actors”. By the end of the 20th
century, with other avenues of profit exhausted, Finanzkapital turned to strategies focused on
consumers and brands. Expanding consumer credit and aiding brand infatuation created the
first major borrow-buy-pay link. Banks (and the financial system behind them) made money
from credit card interest, and also from the rising stock prices of corporations whose brands
dominated consumer consciousness. The second borrow-buy-pay link was created by
fomenting a housing price bubble and incentivizing consumers to take out home equity loans
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for everything – including frivolous consumption (Klein 1999). The capillaries sucking consumer
dollars from Main Street to Wall Street became fire hoses.
My story ends as the page turned shut on the 20th century.
The major financial quake and its aftermath for consumers, of course, burst upon us at
the beginning of the 21st century – accounts of which are proliferating and shocking (Cohan
2009, Johnson and Kwak 2010, Morgenson and Rosner 2011, Sorkin 2010). The story indeed
may end in a great tragedy (Monbiot 2011) if people – qua consumers and citizens – do not
take actions to dismantle the voracious behemoth of Finanzkapital.
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